

Carbon-Sensitive Load Management: A Game-Theoretic Exploration


Wenqian Jiang and Line A. Roald
University of Wisconsin–Madison, email: wjiang233@wisc.edu



Introduction

- Worldwide carbon emission reduction targets and policy

World Bank Group: <https://hdl.handle.net/10986/13334>.



Conventional Wisdom and New Challenges

- Core Strategy**
Increase the penetration of renewable generation and reduce carbon-intensive power generation (especially coal-based electricity).

Carbon taxes on the generation side

Without Carbon Cost:


$$\min_{P_g} c^T P_g$$

With Carbon Cost:


$$\min_{P_g} (c^T + c_{CO_2} e_g^T) P_g$$

- Change generator merit order and make cleaner generation competitive.
- Embed the impact of carbon into price signals (**Increasing prices**).
- Consumers act passively to price signals (**no choice**).

New Trends: Carbon-Sensitive Loads



Source: <https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/largest-green-hydrogen-projects-world-futurefuels/>



Source: <https://verpex.com/blog/cloud-hosting/cloud-data-centers>

- Hydrogen Generation:**
Separate carbon emissions from costs

- Data Centers:**
Actively involve carbon in their decisions

Generators: $\max_{P_{g,l}} (p - c_l) P_{g,l} \text{ s.t. } P_{g,l}^{\min} \leq P_{g,l} \leq P_{g,l}^{\max}$


Consumers: $\max_{P_{d,l}} (u_l - p) P_{d,l} \text{ s.t. } P_{d,l}^{\min} \leq P_{d,l} \leq P_{d,l}^{\max}$

Price-setter Problem: $\sum_{l \in \mathcal{G}} P_{g,l} - \sum_{l \in \mathcal{D}} P_{d,l} \geq 0, \quad (p)$


Equivalent $\sum_{l \in \mathcal{G}} P_{g,l} - \sum_{l \in \mathcal{D}} P_{d,l} \geq 0$

Related Works

Bilevel Formulation



Sequential Formulation



A Game-Theoretic Perspective

Model

Generators:
 $\max_{P_{g,l}} (p - c_l) P_{g,l} \text{ s.t. } P_{g,l}^{\min} \leq P_{g,l} \leq P_{g,l}^{\max}$

Consumers:
 $\max_{P_{d,l}} (u_l - p - \lambda_e \cdot c_{CO_2}) P_{d,l} \text{ s.t. } P_{d,l}^{\min} \leq P_{d,l} \leq P_{d,l}^{\max}$

Price-setter Problem:


$$\sum_{l \in \mathcal{G}} P_{g,l} - \sum_{l \in \mathcal{D}} P_{d,l} \geq 0, \quad (p)$$

Average carbon emission:

$$\lambda_e \sum_{l \in \mathcal{D}} P_{d,l} = \sum_{l \in \mathcal{G}} e_{g,l} P_{g,l}$$


What would happen if carbon-sensitive loads had “perfect” knowledge of carbon emission intensity signals?

Equilibrium Formulation



Numerical Studies

Simplified Three-bus System



- Reduce consumers' electricity demand instead of impacting generation dispatch.
- Consumers act actively to carbon signals.
- Average carbon emission signals may not be so effective.

IEEE RTS-GMLC System

Models	Carbon Cost Range	Total Generation (MWh)	Total Generation Cost (\$)	Total Carbon (tons)	Average Carbon (tons/MWh)	Total Carbon Cost (\$)
WC	-	8550	63748	3001.8	0.351	0
GM	[10,40]	8550	64691	2870	0.336	26977.7
	[30,60]	8448.3	64400.25	2706.3	0.32	44113.4
	[50,80]	8431.8	64157.2	2696.4	0.32	61207.7
SM	[10,40]	8550	63748	3001.8	0.351	80271.3
	[30,60]	8515.8	63358	2969	0.349	138965.4
	[50,80]	8349	61458.5	2808.8	0.336	188404.7
OM	[10,40]	8550	63748	3001.8	0.351	80371.3
	[30,60]	8515.8	63358	2969	0.349	138965.4
	[50,80]	8368.4	61677.3	2827.4	0.338	189575.5

- SM is equivalent to OM for both low and high carbon cost ranges.
- GM reduces carbon more effectively at higher generation costs.

Conclusion

- Carbon-sensitive loads want to act actively to **carbon signals**, not reactively response to price signals.
- Average carbon emission intensity signal maybe not a good signal for load shifting.** Marginal carbon emission intensity signal may be better one.
- Equilibrium model formulation contributes to measuring and evaluating the effectiveness of different carbon signals, especially consumer-oriented signals.