

# Carbon-Sensitive Load Management: A Game-Theoretic Exploration



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
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## Introduction



- Worldwide carbon emission reduction targets and policy

World Bank Group: <https://hdl.handle.net/10986/1334>.



- As one of the largest emitters, the electricity sector is required to cut the carbon emission
- Many carbon markets aim only for power generation

## Conventional Wisdom and New Challenges

### Core Strategy

Increase the penetration of renewable generation and reduce carbon-intensive power generation (especially coal-based electricity).

### Carbon taxes on the generation side

Without Carbon Cost:


$$\min_{P_g} c^T P_g$$

With Carbon Cost:

$$\min_{P_g} (c^T + c_{CO_2} e_g^T) P_g$$

- ✓ Change generator merit order and make cleaner generation competitive.
- ✓ Embed the impact of carbon into price signals (Increasing prices).
- ✓ Consumers act passively to price signals (no choice).

### New Trends: Carbon-Sensitive Loads



Source: <https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/largest-green-hydrogen-projects-world-futurefuels/>



Source: <https://verpex.com/blog/cloud-hosting/cloud-data-centers>

### Hydrogen Generation:

Separate carbon emissions from costs

### Data Centers:

Actively involve carbon in their decisions

$$\text{Generators: } \max_{P_{g,l}} (p - c_l) P_{g,l} \text{ s.t. } P_{g,l}^{\min} \leq P_{g,l} \leq P_{g,l}^{\max}$$

$$\text{Consumers: } \max_{P_{d,l}} (u_l - p) P_{d,l} \text{ s.t. } P_{d,l}^{\min} \leq P_{d,l} \leq P_{d,l}^{\max}$$

$$\text{Price-setter Problem: } \sum_{l \in \mathcal{G}} P_{g,l} - \sum_{l \in \mathcal{D}} P_{d,l} \geq 0, \quad (p)$$

$$\max_{P_{d,l}} (u_l^T P_d - c^T P_g)$$

$$\text{ s.t. } P_{g,l}^{\min} \leq P_{g,l} \leq P_{g,l}^{\max}$$


$$P_{g,l}^{\min} \leq P_{g,l} \leq P_{g,l}^{\max}$$

Equivalent

$$\sum_{l \in \mathcal{G}} P_{g,l} - \sum_{l \in \mathcal{D}} P_{d,l} \geq 0$$


## Related Works

### Bilevel Formulation



- ✓ Consumers give up their control to market clearing.

### Sequential Formulation



- ✓ Time mismatch.

## A Game-Theoretic Perspective

### Model

$$\text{Generators: } \max_{P_{g,l}} (p - c_l) P_{g,l} \text{ s.t. } P_{g,l}^{\min} \leq P_{g,l} \leq P_{g,l}^{\max}$$

$$\text{Consumers: } \max_{P_{d,l}} (u_l - p - \lambda_e \cdot c_{CO_2}) P_{d,l} \text{ s.t. } P_{d,l}^{\min} \leq P_{d,l} \leq P_{d,l}^{\max}$$


$$\text{Price-setter Problem: } \sum_{l \in \mathcal{G}} P_{g,l} - \sum_{l \in \mathcal{D}} P_{d,l} \geq 0, \quad (p)$$

$$\text{Average carbon emission: } \lambda_e \sum_{l \in \mathcal{D}} P_{d,l} = \sum_{l \in \mathcal{G}} e_{g,l} P_{g,l}$$

- ✓ Consumer-oriented choice
  - Carbon signals
  - Carbon costs


What would happen if carbon-sensitive loads had “perfect” knowledge of carbon emission intensity signals?

### Equilibrium Formulation



## Numerical Studies

### Simplified Three-bus System



- ✓ Reduce consumers' electricity demand instead of impacting generation dispatch.
- ✓ Consumers act actively to carbon signals.
- ✓ Average carbon emission signals may not be so effective.

### IEEE RTS-GMLC System

Models	Carbon Cost Range	Total Generation (MWh)	Total Generation Cost (\$)	Total Carbon (tons)	Average Carbon (tons/MWh)	Total Carbon Cost (\$)
WC	-	8550	63748	3001.8	0.351	0
GM	[10,40]	8550	<b>64691</b>	2870	0.336	26977.7
	[30,60]	8448.3	64400.25	2706.3	0.32	44113.4
	[50,80]	8431.8	64157.2	2696.4	0.32	61207.7
SM	[10,40]	8550	63748	3001.8	0.351	80271.3
	[30,60]	8515.8	63358	2969	0.349	138965.4
	[50,80]	<b>8349</b>	<b>61458.5</b>	<b>2808.8</b>	<b>0.336</b>	<b>188404.7</b>
OM	[10,40]	8550	63748	3001.8	0.351	80371.3
	[30,60]	8515.8	63358	2969	0.349	138965.4
	[50,80]	<b>8368.4</b>	<b>61677.3</b>	<b>2827.4</b>	<b>0.338</b>	<b>189575.5</b>

- ✓ SM is equivalent to OM for both low and high carbon cost ranges.
- ✓ GM reduces carbon more effectively at higher generation costs.

## Conclusion

- Carbon-sensitive loads want to act actively to carbon signals, not reactively response to price signals.
- Average carbon emission intensity signal maybe not a good signal for load shifting. Marginal carbon emission intensity signal may be better one.
- Equilibrium model formulation contributes to measuring and evaluating the effectiveness of different carbon signals, especially consumer-oriented signals.